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	 	 AbstrACt
The idea of scaling up aid to developing countries has in-
creased fears of “Dutch Disease” in the donor community and recipi-
ent countries. Through its impact on inflation and the exchange-rate, 
aid could slow down growth and human development, undermining 
the aims of donors and recipients. By using the basic model of Dutch 
Disease, adjusting it to the circumstance of developing countries and 
taking a medium-term view, we explain how it is possible to avoid 
Dutch Disease. Important factors determining the impact seem to 
be: the spending pattern of aid, the amount of imports financed with 
aid and the coordination between the fiscal and monetary authorities. 
As the IMF is one of the most important participants in the discus-
sion around this topic, we also clarify the specific terms this institu-
tion uses to discuss this sort of topics. The paper ends with referring 
to the fact that understanding the problem is one thing, taking these 
economic decisions on a political level may in certain countries form 
another problem.IOB Discussion Paper 2007-05 • 5 Dutch Disease in Aid-recipient Countries
	 	 résumé
L’idée de l’extension de l’aide aux pays en voie de dévelop-
pement a renforcé auprès des bailleurs de fonds et des pays bénéficiaires 
la crainte du “Dutch Disease”. Suite à son impact sur l’inflation et le taux 
de change, l’aide au développement pourrait ralentir la croissance et le 
développement humain, sapant ainsi les objectifs des bailleurs et des bé-
néficiaires. Dans ce cahier, nous utilisons le modèle de base de “Dutch 
Disease”, l’adaptons aux circonstances des pays en voie de développe-
ment et prenons une durée de moyen terme pour expliquer comment il 
est possible d’éviter le “Dutch Disease”. Les facteurs les plus importants 
qui déterminent l’impact, semblent être les dépenses financées par l’aide, 
l’importance des importations dans ces dépenses et la coordination en-
tre les autorités fiscales et monétaires. Comme le FMI est un des parti-
cipants les plus importants dans les discussions sur ce sujet, nous expli-
quons aussi la terminologie spécifique utilisée par cette institution. Nous 
terminons ce cahier en soulignant que si la compréhension du problème 
est un point, la prise de décisions nécessaires au niveau politique en est 
un autre. IOB Discussion Paper 2007-05 • 7 Dutch Disease in Aid-recipient Countries
	 1	 IntroduCtIon
In macroeconomic theory, Dutch Disease is a well-known 
concept named after the economic development of the Netherlands in 
the 1970s1 . Initially, the country achieved successful economic growth 
rates during the late 1960s and early 1970, following the discovery of 
large natural gas reserves in the North Sea. In the middle of the 70s 
however, the situation changed and the exports of gas started to have 
an important adverse impact on the economy. The large gas-exports 
increased the demand for guilders significantly, making the currency 
appreciate against other currencies. This had a damaging impact on 
non-gas exporters whose products became relatively more expensive 
on the world market and who had to scale down or close production. 
Although this phenomenon is generally associated with 
the discovery and export of natural resources, it can be caused by any 
economic change that provides a large increase in the availability of 
foreign exchange to the economy: a sharp increase in export prices, 
FDI or aid flows (Edwards and Van Wijnbergen, 1989; Adam, 2005). 
Consequently, very diverse situations were studied with this model, 
from the war reparations Germany had to pay after the first World War, 
to the adverse economic impact on the Spanish economy of natural 
resources discovered in its colonies in the 16th century. During the 
last years, research shifted to Dutch Disease caused by aid. The rea-
son mostly cited for this increasing interest, is the new scaling up of 
aid. That recent evolutions in the way aid is administered might also 
increase the danger for Dutch Disease will be discussed in the third 
section.
To understand this increased risk, a clear understanding 
of the macroeconomic reality behind the concept is needed. In the 
second section, we will therefore give an economic background for the 
analysis of the macroeconomic effects of aid, the danger of Dutch Dis-
ease and its possible therapies. To make the analysis more concrete, 
we will end this section with a simulation of the short and medium 
term impact of aid. In section four we will go further into the monetary 
and exchange rate impact of aid and section five discusses the need for 
coordination between the monetary and fiscal policies.
 Throughout the paper we will assume, unless otherwise 
stated, that aid flows constitute a long-term means of finance for the 
government. This is important as the handling of long term financial 
inflows differs from the way temporary shocks should be handled2. 
For temporary shocks, economic reasoning suggests that the govern-
ment spreads the benefits over time, a point we will discuss in section 
six. Secondly, we will assume that aid is spent by the recipient gov-
ernment, more and more reality today. When aid does not accrue to 
the government but to other economic actors, the story differs to the 
extent that the spending-pattern of these actors differs from that of 
.1  The term was first used in an article published in 
The Economist in November 1977.
 
2  We acknowledge that aid has often the problem 
of having temporary shocks and being unpredict-
able in the long term, but this is still different from 
the shocks that are meant in the economic theory 
here.
3  In this model all forms of aid are aggregated. • IOB Discussion Paper 2007-05 Dutch Disease in Aid-recipient Countries
the government. The importance of the way aid is administered for the 
emergence of Dutch Disease is a related point. We will point to some of 
the differences between aid modalities in the margin of our discussion, 
suggesting that they affect the macroeconomic reasoning developed 
in this paper.
Finally we will explain the terms the IMF uses in these 
discussions in section seven of this paper and discuss in section eight 
the evidence that is found for Dutch Disease. Before concluding, we 
venture beyond economics and look into the way in which political 
economy can play a role in the explanation of Dutch Disease. 
Before proceeding, we want to clarify a common misun-
derstanding between the terms resource curse and Dutch Disease. 
	 Textbox	1:	 The	link	between	the	‘resource	curse’	and	‘Dutch	Disease’
A concept that is often related to Dutch Disease, is the resource curse. In an eco-
nomic context, this concept refers to the link that is observed between large natu-
ral resource revenues and bad economic performance. The economic literature 
identifies three channels that possibly cause this link: 
  1. The rents generated by the natural resources lead to rent seeking and
    corruption.
  2. The volatility of the revenues generated by natural resources, driven by
    fluctuation in the commodity prices can have an adverse impact on the    
    growth of those countries.
  3. Finally, economic growth can also be reduced through Dutch Disease. 
    Based on Sala-i-Martin and Subramanian (2003)IOB Discussion Paper 2007-05 •  Dutch Disease in Aid-recipient Countries
	 2	 the	model	of	dutCh	dIseAse
   2.1  The textbook-model of Dutch Disease.
 
To start this discussion about Dutch Disease, we present 
a framework that explains the macroeconomic reasoning behind the 
concept. The model is based on Nkusu (2004a) and uses the assump-
tions of the Dutch Disease model developed by Corden and Neary 
(1982): a small open economy producing two types of goods, i.e. trad-
ables and nontradables. The goods are produced with one mobile pro-
duction factor, labour, that is transferable between the two sectors. 
Finally, we assume that there is full and efficient employment, and an 
equilibrium in the balance of trade. 
The inflow of aid has in the first instance a real rather than 
a monetary effect on the economy, since its main impact falls on the 
level of real income and on the intersectoral allocation of production 
factors. We will therefore initially make abstraction of the consequenc-
es for monetary policy in this model. In section four, we will explicitly 
address these consequences. 
	 Figure	1:	 The	textbook-model	of	Dutch	Disease
 Source: Nkusu, 2004a10 • IOB Discussion Paper 2007-05 Dutch Disease in Aid-recipient Countries
Before the aid surge, we assume that the economy is us-
ing all its production factors to produce tradables and nontradables. 
The economy is producing and consuming at point B in the lower-right 
quadrant of figure 1, the intersection of the production possibility fron-
tier (PPF) with the highest possible indifference curve (ID). When we 
reflect this point on the upper-left and –right quadrants, respectively 
the market for tradables and nontradables, we can see the initial equi-
libriums in these two separate markets. In the upper-left quadrant, 
the demand curve is perfectly elastic, following the small-country-as-
sumption. At point C, demand for tradables equals supply of tradable 
goods in the country, giving an initial equilibrium in the balance of 
trade. For nontradables, the supply and demand curve have the nor-
mal shape and intersect at M.
When the country now receives aid3 , at least part of it 
will be used to buy nontradables, how much depending on the aid-mo-
dality that is used. In the upper-right quadrant, this increased demand 
is reflected in an upward shift of the demand to DNT’, causing an in-
crease in the price from PNT to PNT’. As the price of tradables remains 
at PT, following the small-country-hypothesis, and taking into account 
our assumption that the monetary authorities do not intervene in the 
nominal exchange rate, the real exchange rate4  (RER) appreciates and 
tradables from the recipient country become relatively more expensive 
on the world market5 . Logically, this has an impact on the supply and 
demand of goods. On the one side, we see shifts of the supply curves 
in the tradable and nontradable sector. As the demand-shift towards 
nontradables  makes  the  production  of  such  goods  relatively  more 
profitable, resources are drawn away from the production of tradables 
towards the production of nontradables and equilibrium shifts from 
B to B’ on the PPF.  The reflection of B’ in the upper quadrants shows 
this effect on the supply-curves of the two sectors. The supply in the 
tradable sector shrinks from ST to ST’, in the nontradable sector the 
supply increases from SNT to SNT’. On the other side, consumption of 
tradables is higher as these goods become relatively cheaper6 . To see 
this effect, we first rotate the budget line from Y to Y’ as nontradables 
became relatively more expensive. Secondly, the budget line shifts to 
Y’’ because of the increased real income brought about by the aid in-
flows, making it possible to reach a higher indifference curve, ID’. The 
impact on the demand for tradables can be seen by reflecting point 
B’’ on the upper-left-quadrant.  After the aid shock, tradables demand 
has increased relatively to the situation before the aid surge: from C to 
C’’. As the production of tradables lowered after the inflow of aid, the 
country now has a deficit on the trade balance: C’’-C’, financed by the 
international purchasing power received, aid7 . The reflection of B’’ on 
the upper-right-quadrant shows the impact of aid on the demand for 
nontradables that was explained before. 
 
4  For  the  RER,  we  adopt  the  definition  that  is 
usually used in trade theory. The real exchange 
rate of country J at time t, RERJt , is then defined 
as the price of tradables in domestic currency at 
time t (PTt) relative to the price of nontradables in 
domestic currency at time t (PNt): RERJt= (PTt)/(PNt).  
Confronted with the actual decision of compos-
ing a RER for a developing country, this definition 
is however not very useful. As the availability of 
data is very limited in most of these countries, the 
RER is mostly measured by: RERJit= (Eit)(P*
it)/(PJt), 
where Eit is the nominal exchange rate of country 
J with respect to country i at time t, P*
it is a price 
index of country i at time t and PJt is a price index 
of country J at time t (Edwards, 1989; White and 
Wignaraja, 1992).
5This appreciation also makes imports cheaper. 
6  We assume that the tradable good is not an in-
ferior good.
7  This  reasoning  describes  the  microeconomic 
dynamics of the ex post trade gap. To that extent 
it is consistent with the two-gap model.
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The direct welfare effect on the whole economy is thus 
generally positive. In the long run, the citizens of a country not receiv-
ing aid can normally only consume the products they produce. They 
consume  their  nontradables  and  use  their  exports  to  buy  imports 
(trade deficit = 0). If a country receives aid, it can consume more than 
it produces as the aid gives the country extra purchasing power on the 
international market, allowing it to import without the need for pro-
ducing exports to finance these imports. Production factors that are 
no longer used for the production of exports can be transferred to the 
production of nontradables, for consumption in the economy. In this 
way consumption of both tradables and nontradables increases and 
welfare in the economy is higher after the receipt of aid then before. 
The real problem economists see in Dutch Disease is the 
shift of production from tradables to nontradables. The reason for this 
concern is the fact that in the economic development of a country, the 
performance of the export sector, mainly the non-traditional, is gener-
ally seen as an important engine for growth. Van Wijnbergen (1984) 
notes that all of the post-World-War II success stories promoted ac-
tively the development of their traded goods sector. Therefore, the 
promotion of a successful export sector has always been one of the 
main purposes of development aid (Van Wijnbergen, 1986)8 . The rea-
son for the importance of the tradable sector is technological progress, 
which is assumed to be faster in the traded non-sheltered sectors than 
in the non-traded sectors (Van Wijnbergen, 1984).  To meet interna-
tional standards and to compete in a global competitive world, export-
ers have to raise their standards and acquire new skills and compe-
tences that are assumed to spill over to domestic producers. When an 
appreciation of the real exchange rate cuts back the export sector, a 
sector that is already not very large in most developing countries, this 
process of positive spillovers is interrupted and the gains for the whole 
economy can be undercut. This gives rise to two problems. Firstly, it 
will impede the development of the export sector that is needed for 
the development of the country (Bevan, 2005; Adam, 2005). Second-
ly, as the most important exporting sector in developing countries is 
the agriculture sector, this sector will be hit most. Consequently, the 
many, often poor, families that are working in this sector will be af-
fected, causing social and political problems (Benjamin et al., 1989; 
Migara and De Silva, 1994; Stevens, 2003a).  The challenge is thus to 
use aid funds efficiently to make sure that this effect is only temporal, 
a point to which we will turn later. (DFID, 2002; Rajan and Subrama-
nian, 2005; Adam and Bevan, 2005; Prati et al., 2003) 
8  Although  there  is  broad  agreement  that  a 
positive relation exists between trade and growth, 
there  is  uncertainty  about  the  precise  channel 
through which this operates, the export sector or 
the import sector. Usually these two go hand in 
hand, exports are needed to pay imports, but the 
distinction matters in the case of Dutch Disease.
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   2.2  Broadening the textbook-model
To put the conclusions of our textbook-model in perspec-
tive, we want to adapt certain hypotheses made and formulate some 
important  remarks  with  respect  to  its  applicability  to  developing 
countries. 
   1.  The first point that has to be noted is the fact that the 
model assumes that the economy is producing on its PPF and thus 
utilising efficiently all available productive resources (Nkusu, 2004a, 
2004b). In developing countries, this assumption is highly question-
able. By relaxing it, we allow that the economy’s production (point B in 
figure 1) lies within its PPF, so that the production of one good can be 
increased without decreasing the production of the other good.
A first reason why developing countries might not be pro-
ducing on their PPF, is the fact that large amounts of production capac-
ity are unused, for example high unemployment or large areas of un-
used land. By using this spare capacity, the supply of nontradables can 
be increased without driving up prices or decreasing the production of 
tradables, reducing the possibility of Dutch Disease. In support of this 
idea, Nkusu (2004b) gives the example of Uganda, where available 
land has been used for the increased production of food crops without 
decreasing the cultivation of cash crops9 . Although these unemployed 
production factors can be important to avoid Dutch Disease effects, 
they can only be relevant to the extent that they can be used for the 
production of the nontradables that are demanded (Adam, 2005; Mi-
gara and De Silva, 1994). An illustration of this problem can be found 
in the post-tsunami reconstruction efforts of Sri Lanka. Unless the 
fact that unemployment rose from 9.2% up to more than 20% in the 
affected  provinces,  the  costs  for  reconstruction  increased  because 
of a lack of skilled construction workers such as carpenters, whose 
skills cannot easily be acquired by others (Jayasuriya et al., 2005; ILO, 
2005). Scaling up to achieve the MDGs may run into similar difficul-
ties. The expansion in basic social services that is needed to achieve 
the goals requires trained personnel, like teachers, nurses and medical 
doctors. As these are in the short run only available in limited amounts, 
increased demand will push up wages and reduce the amount of skilled 
personnel available to other sectors. 
The  inefficiency  with  which  production  factors  are  al-
ready used in the production of goods, might be a second reason for 
not reaching the PPF. 
   2.  A second point concerns the aggregation of exportables 
and importables into one tradable sector. In developing countries this 
assumption, typically used in trade theory, may be far from reality as 
many domestically-produced importables, mainly domestic manufac-
9  Brownbridge and Tumusiime-Mutebile (2007) 
point  to  the  limits  of  this  reasoning.  After  two 
decades of Ugandan economic growth, it can be 
that Uganda has reached its production possibil-
ity frontier.
10 Of course, the macroeconomic impact of these IOB Discussion Paper 2007-05 • 1 Dutch Disease in Aid-recipient Countries
tures, are imperfect substitutes for the imported goods. As the prices 
of these importables are not determined by world markets but by 
domestic markets, there is some room left for the producers of these 
importables to increase their prices and quantities in response to the 
changing conditions in the domestic market (Nkusu, 2004a,b; Stevens, 
2003a). In figure 1, this adaptation will make the demand-curve for 
tradables (DT) downward sloping, so that the price for tradables can 
change. 
Evidence of this difference between importables and ex-
portables was e.g. found in Cameroon by Benjamin et al. (1989). In 
reaction to an appreciation of the RER caused by an oil-boom, the 
agricultural sector suffered badly facing stiff competition from other 
primary exporters. The industrial sector, producing products that are 
imperfect substitutes for imported goods, expanded its production. 
Another example is given by Migara and De Silva (1994) who found 
that the manufacturing sectors in Nigeria and Indonesia grew at an 
even larger rate than the growth rate of the nontraded sector during 
the petroleum boom of 1970-1981. 
That macroeconomic problems are significantly lessened 
when these first two remarks are integrated in the model, is shown in 
Nkusu (2004a).
   3.  Another simplification in the model, was the assumption 
of one mobile production factor, labour. In reality, different production 
factors will be sector-specific and unable to move easily from one sec-
tor to another, for example farmers growing certain crops. This adap-
tation will make the supply curves in figure 1 shift less easily. 
By adding these sector-specific production factors, we can 
show that the general welfare improvement will not be felt by every in-
dividual as the structure of the economy changes. Providers of labour 
will normally benefit. Following the higher demand for nontradables, 
the wages for labourers increase to incite them to work in this sector. 
In a competitive market where labour is assumed to be transferable 
between the two sectors, the wage in the tradable sector will increase 
with the same amount. A sector-specific production factor may how-
ever witness a different situation. Those specific to the production of 
tradables will loose as the increased input price of labour decreases 
profit margins and the purchasing power of incomes declines because 
of the increasing price level. Producers of nontradables stand to gain 
as their purchasing power will increase. Rural households that mainly 
produce cash crops for exports may thus suffer a loss in income while 
farmers producing mainly nontradable food crops can see an increase 
in their income.1 • IOB Discussion Paper 2007-05 Dutch Disease in Aid-recipient Countries
   4.  Further, the model showed that the amount of money 
spent on nontradables is a determining factor for the degree of appre-
ciation, as it determines the upward shift of DNT in figure 1. Aid can 
however be spent in other ways that affect the real exchange rate less. 
One such possibility that is generally believed to cause the least ap-
preciation, is the use of aid to buy imports (DFID, 2002; UNDP, 2005c; 
Heller and Gupta, 2002, Bourguignon and Sundberg, 2006). The rea-
soning is that the foreign currency received from aid, leaks back out of 
the economy instead of stimulating demand for domestic goods and 
services. In figure 1, spending a larger proportion of the aid on imports, 
will lead to a smaller shift of the DNT curve. 
A suggestion of this sort was made by Walter Mahler, 
representative of the IMF in a discussion about the possible adverse 
impact of large aid-inflows on the Ugandan economy. He stressed 
that if more aid were to be delivered in forms such as medical supplies 
instead of local purchasing power, the economy would not be desta-
bilized (Phillips, 2002). Behind this reasoning is the assumption that 
when these medical supplies are handed out to people, there will be 
no effect on the demand for nontradables or on the amount of money 
supply in the economy10 . 
Heller  (2005a)  and  Foster  and  Killick  (2006)  point  to 
second-round effects that should not be overlooked.  If imports that 
are bought with aid would have been imported otherwise or produced 
locally, the money that is freed can still produce exchange rate appre-
ciations in the economy. To avoid this effect, the imports need to be 
non-competitive to the local economy and not otherwise imported 
or produced locally. Medical supplies are generally a good example of 
this. 
Knowing the importance of how the aid is spent, govern-
ments will have to take into consideration these sorts of spending 
opportunities that have less impact on their macroeconomy. Donors 
will have to take into account how and to whom they deliver their aid 
as different economic actors have different propensities to spend on 
nontradables, affecting the spending pattern of aid. So are projects 
generally assumed to be spending large amounts of money on imports, 
while budget support through the government will more likely follow 
the spending pattern of the government and be spent mainly on non-
tradables.
   5.  Although we assumed in our model that trade was liber-
alised, this is not always reality in many developing countries. With 
trade liberalisation, the eff ect of Dutch Disease will be weakened as 
consumers can switch more easily between domestic and imported 
goods in response to a relative price change (Gupta et al., 2005; Rob-
erts, 2005). 
medical supplies would also depend on the avail-
ability of medical staff and infrastructure. When 
aid is needed to release these bottlenecks, Dutch 
Disease effects might still occur. IOB Discussion Paper 2007-05 • 15 Dutch Disease in Aid-recipient Countries
   2.3  The medium-term impact of aid
The economic reasoning developed in the previous sec-
tions, seems to give serious reasons for doubting the positive welfare 
effect of aid. It tells however not the whole story as it considers only 
the short-run impact of aid on the demand-side. To evaluate the full 
effect of aid, we have to complete the story and look at the medium-
term impact of aid when the supply-side has time to come into play 
(Heller, 2005a; Bourguignon and Sundberg, 2006). This effect will be 
determined by the way aid is spent and the reaction of the supply side. 
As we will show, once the supply-side is taken into account, it remains 
an open question whether the real exchange rate appreciates or not. 
Logically, a government can spend aid in several ways: 
   1.  In developing countries where the tax burden on the pri-
vate sector is often too high, a reduction of tax rates might be consid-
ered (Adam and Bevan, 2001a; Chen and Reinikka, 1999). Using aid to 
lower tax rates in these circumstances would not only boost domestic 
investment but also lower the incentives for tax avoidance, keeping 
the question open whether revenues from taxes will decrease or not 
(DFID, 2002; Adam and Bevan, 2001a). 
   2.  Aid flows may also be used to reduce domestic govern-
ment debt. This reduces the future cost of domestic debt service to the 
government, freeing up money for other purposes. Secondly, it will re-
duce the pressure on domestic interest rates and lower the cost of cap-
ital to the private sector as it can be assumed that domestic interest 
rates in developing countries are mainly influenced by domestic saving 
and borrowing. In this way the private banking sector can reorganize 
its portfolio and increase borrowing to the private sector, stimulating 
investment and growth (DFID, 2002).
Although the two previous options enable in principle an 
increase in the productive capacity and productivity of the economy, 
their effect depends on the reaction of the private sector. Because 
of the underprovision of public and collective goods, such as secure 
property rights, transport, energy, education, health care… in many 
aid-dependent developing countries, the marginal impact of aid is ex-
pected to be highest when it finances public expenditure programmes. 
These programs can then help the economy move closer to its produc-
tion possibility frontier by removing different bottlenecks that hinder 
the development of the economy, or help in expanding the production 
possibilities of the country. This use of the funds for strengthening the 
public sector must thus certainly not be seen as a way of crowding out 
the private sector. Public expenditure may on the contrary have an im-
portant enabling effect on private investment (UNDP, 2005c; DFID, 16 • IOB Discussion Paper 2007-05 Dutch Disease in Aid-recipient Countries
2002, Nkusu, 2004b). Foster and Killick (2006) even argue that these 
bottlenecks might be a larger problem to the export sector than the 
appreciation of the RER.  
   3.  The best way to use aid may thus be an increase in pub-
lic expenditure. In this way, an increase in the supply potential of the 
economy, needed to reverse Dutch Disease, is more likely to occur. The 
possible expenditure items that can be financed with aid are (DFID, 
2002; Barder, 2006): 
   i.  Transfer  payments  or  government  wages  are  the  first 
items aid can finance in the budget of a government. Although increas-
ing consumption of very poor people may be a laudable policy, this 
method has the least chance of increasing the supply-potential of the 
economy. On top of this, it makes the long-term financing of govern-
ment budget harder for the recipient country as external financing will 
not eternally finance wages or social services. The payment of arrears 
in wages may however be seen as a possible option for spending aid as 
it might make government’s budget healthy again. 
   ii.  Spending on social services, improving the effectiveness 
of government institutions, reducing corruption, increasing account-
ability, improving the effectiveness of legal administration,… might 
be important as they do increase growth and productivity in the long 
term(for evidence, see for example Krueger and Lindahl, 2001, finding 
a positive impact of education on economic growth).
   iii.  The best way of increasing productivity and growth in the 
economy are however investments in infrastructure (transport, com-
munications, power generation and distribution), fertilizer, irrigation, 
alleviation of administrative bottlenecks,… Compared to the previous 
expenditure items, their impact on Dutch Disease might be faster as 
they have a more direct impact on the supply side to counteract the 
effect of the demand side (for evidence, see for example Calderon and 
Servon, 2003, on the positive impact of infrastructure on economic 
growth)
The precise medium-term outcome of aid-financed public 
expenditure will depend on the division of the funds between those 
three expenditure items. Too much spending on the transfer payments 
and wages may not help to stop Dutch Disease. Following this idea, 
Corden (1984) argues that the true reason for the Dutch Disease in the 
Netherlands was not the adverse impact of the RER appreciation on 
the manufacturing sector, but rather the use of the money to finance 
an unsustainable level of transfer payments and wages. Between 1964 
and 1979, the share of central and local government and social secu-
rity expenditures in national income rose from 34 to 50%, mainly be-
cause of transfer payments, an unsustainable level, taken into account 
its financing, and politically difficult to reduce. A reaction of the sup-IOB Discussion Paper 2007-05 • 17 Dutch Disease in Aid-recipient Countries
ply side is also not directly induced by this sort of spending. To avoid 
similar problems in the future, Bevan (2005) even suggested that the 
massive use of aid for social sectors in developing countries may need 
to be reviewed. The success of investment in infrastructure is reported 
by the independent evaluation office of the IMF. They refer to research, 
by for example Clemens, Radelet and Bhavani (2004), showing that 
aid is more likely to be growth enhancing when it finances infrastruc-
ture rather than social-sector programmes. The reason is the fact that 
the positive effects on productivity and exports will materialize faster 
when aid finances infrastructure then when it finances education and 
health programs. Secondly they point to the fact that the import con-
tent tends to be higher for investments so that an adverse macroeco-
nomic impact will more likely be avoided (IMF-IEO, 2005).  This does 
not however mean that all aid must be directed towards infrastruc-
tural investments. Helping poor people survive through social spend-
ing might certainly be needed in those countries. Everything depends 
on country-specific circumstances, and great attention must thus be 
paid to a well thought-out use of aid. As the simulations in section 2.4 
illustrate, rather modest productivity benefits from aid would be suf-
ficient. In the Human Development Report of 2005, the balanced allo-
cation of available funds to infrastructure, agricultural production and 
investment in human capital is seen as the reason why countries like 
Ethiopia, Mozambique and Tanzania were able to avoid Dutch Disease 
while receiving large amounts of aid (UNDP, 2005b). 
Finally, we want to point to two aspects that must be tak-
en into account with respect to the expenditures financed: 
   1.  Whether programs for the nontradable or tradable sector 
will have to be scaled up first depends on certain country-specific char-
acteristics (DFID, 2002; Gupta et al., 2005; Adam and Bevan, 2005). 
As the tradable sector is directly hit by the RER appreciation, it is logi-
cal to direct aid mainly towards this sector. The adverse effects of the 
real exchange rate appreciation on this sector can then be reduced or 
compensated by the productivity gains induced by aid. The problem 
with this sort of productivity gains might however be that they can 
induce a shift of resources from the nontradable to the tradable sec-
tor, making the real exchange rate appreciate further. As productivity 
in the tradable sector rises at the same time, this appreciation does 
not need to have a second adverse impact on the amount of exports 
(Bevan, 2005; Heller, 2005a).
When aid flows are used to improve the supply potential 
and the productivity of the nontradable sector, the increase in supply 
may be large enough to limit the pressure on nontradable prices and 
offset the real exchange rate appreciation. The simulation of Adam 
and Bevan (2005), that we will refer to in section 2.4, suggests that 1 • IOB Discussion Paper 2007-05 Dutch Disease in Aid-recipient Countries
aid may have the highest return when it enhances a supply response of 
the nontradable sector. 
   2.  A second aspect that must always be held in mind in those 
countries, is the impact these policies might have on the overall goal of 
poverty-reduction. By financing infrastructure investments, the direct 
beneficiaries are generally not the poor (often working in the informal 
rural sectors), but the non-poor working in services and manufactur-
ing (Adam and Bevan, 2005). White and Wignaraja (1992) report that 
the main beneficiaries of the aid boom in Sri Lanka, at the end of the 
70s, were the colonists working in large-scale irrigation and power pro-
grams, the main losers were the farmers who saw a decrease in their 
incomes from tree crops caused by higher taxes and an appreciation of 
the RER.
  
   2.4  A simulation to illustrate the effects of aid
To illustrate Dutch Disease, the effect of the inflow of aid 
on the demand side and the reaction of the supply side to different 
public expenditure programmes, we reproduce the results of a simu-
lation done by Christopher Adam and David Bevan (Adam and Bevan, 
2005). The model they developed is based on the characteristics of a 
typical ‘post-stabilization’ African country11  that is already receiving 
aid equal to 11 percent of GDP. The public infrastructure capital stock 
is assumed to be only halve of its ‘optimal’ value and public infrastruc-
ture investment augments the capital stock after one year. In such an 
economy, they test the macroeconomic impact of permanently scaling 
up aid by 12.5%12 . In all cases aid is used exclusively to finance an 
increase in public infrastructure investment, but the cases differ in the 
spillovers which public investment generates on private sector pro-
ductivity. Five scenarios are tested: 
   1.  In the first simulation, infrastructure investment has no 
effect on the productivity of the private sector, reflecting the effect of 
aid on the demand side alone. 
   2.  In a second simulation, the supply side comes into play. 
The investment enhances private sector productivity equally between 
tradables and nontradables. 
   3.  In simulation three, the productivity impact is only felt in 
the export sector. 
   4.  The  fourth  simulation  assumes  that  the  public  invest-
ment is totally biased towards the nontradable-sector. 
   5.  The last simulation is the same as the fourth, it only takes 
the extra assumption that the income elasticity of demand for food 
falls below one. 
The simulated effect of the aid flow on the export weight-
ed real exchange rate13 , total exports, total real household disposable 
11The country is assumed to produce basic food 
crops,  export  cash  crops,  manufactured  goods 
and  services.    The  government  undertakes  its 
regular tasks of taxing households, offering gov-
ernment services and providing public infrastruc-
ture that can boost the productivity of the private 
sector. The households consume and save and are 
divided into three groups: rural households that 
mainly  produce  and  sell  cash-  and  food-crops, 
urban  skilled  households  and  urban  unskilled 
households (Adam, 2005). 
12 This increase equals just under 2% of GDP and 
can  be  compared  to  the  surges  recently  experi-
enced by Tanzania, Uganda and Mozambique.
 
 
13 The  export  weighted  real  exchange  rate  is 
one  of  the  possible  variants  of  the  multilateral 
exchange  rate.  This  multilateral  exchange  rate, 
MERJt , for country J at time t is composed of sum-
ming up all the bilateral real exchange rates, RERJit   
of country J at time t with its K trading partners 
and weighting them by their importance in the 
trade of the country,
ai:                                              or                                                .
When the bilateral exports are used as weights, 
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income and the rural share in this total real income, in these 5 scenar-
io’s is shown in figure 2. All results are reported relative to a baseline 
case where there was no increase in aid. 
	 Figure	2:	 Response	of	4	macroeconomic	variables	to	the	increase	in		
	 	 aid-financed	public	investment. 
 
Source: Adam and Bevan, 2005
A first view on the graphs learns us that all simulations 
have the same effects in the first year14 . This illustrates the plausi-
ble assumption that it takes time to augment the capital stock of the 
economy and shows thus the effect on the demand side explained in 
section 2.1. As theory predicted, the export weighted real exchange 
rate appreciates, exports decrease and total real household dispos-
able income is higher because of the aid flows. The income share of the 
rural households decreases as their income is assumed to depend on 
exported cash crops.  
When we look further in time, we see that in the first sim-
ulation the economic situation progressively deteriorates over time. 
The main reason is that the appreciated real exchange rate increases 
the cost of producing capital goods, as capital formation is assumed 
14 The fifth simulation has some differences but 
these are very small and caused by the lower in-
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to be intensive in nontradable services. Together with the natural de-
terioration of the capital stock and the lack of spillovers from public 
infrastructure to private investment, these effects dominate the po-
tential impact of the weakening real exchange rate appreciation in year 
two, lowering the capital stock of the economy. Because of bad eco-
nomic performance, the improved situation of households in the first 
year does not persist. Real income of households remains only slightly 
above the baseline after 10 years, but the situation differs between 
rural and urban families. An explanation for this is found in the fact 
that infrastructure investments employ mainly urban labour and use 
intermediate goods from the manufacturing and service sector, two 
sectors in which the rural labour force is typically assumed not to be 
active. This simulation reflects the classic fear for Dutch Disease, but, 
as assumed, looks only at the demand side effect. The following simu-
lations show that reality will be different when aid is used in a ‘good 
way’, allowing the supply side to come into play.  
When public investment is assumed to have equal pro-
ductivity spillovers to the two sectors, the effect is totally different. 
The economy revives, the initial exchange rate appreciation nearly to-
tally reverses and, although there remains a small appreciation, the 
export sector recovers. Also for the households the situation is much 
better than in the first simulation. Not only does their real disposable 
income increase, the rise in total income is nearly the same for rural 
households as for urban households. 
With  productivity  effects  that  are  biased  towards  the 
tradable-sector, the real exchange rate remains substantially lower 
than when spillovers are neutral. The impact on exports of these two 
opposing forces, public investment supporting exports and a lower real 
exchange rate that makes exports less profitable, are lower exports 
than in the second scenario, illustrating the importance of spillovers 
towards the nontradable sector. The most positive effect of this policy 
is the impact on disposable income. Although total real household dis-
posable income is at the end lower than in the second simulation, it is 
the only simulation where rural households, that are supposed to be 
producing exported cashcrops, are better off than urban household.
The last two experiments test the macroeconomic con-
sequences  of  aid-financed  public  investment  biased  towards  the 
nontradable sector. In both scenarios, the appreciation of the real ex-
change rate is reversed faster than with any of the other policy-meas-
ures. The most interesting conclusion can be made by looking at the 
upper-right quadrant. Exports are predicted to recover faster in these 
two scenarios than in the one where public investment was oriented 
directly towards this sector. This illustrates the importance of spillo-
vers towards the nontradable sector. The main differences between 
the last two simulations can be seen when we compare their effects 
on the household incomes. Although in both situations total dispos-IOB Discussion Paper 2007-05 • 21 Dutch Disease in Aid-recipient Countries
able income increases significantly, the division of the increased in-
come differs. In the fourth simulation, the division is more or less equal 
between rural and urban households. With a lower income elasticity 
of demand for food, the rural households see their income decrease, 
while urban households experience a significant increase. 
	 3	 Why	ConCerns	for	dutCh	dIseAse	Are	on		 	
	 	 	 the	InCreAse
	
Over the last years, concerns have been increasing that 
aid might cause Dutch Disease in recipient countries. Now that the ba-
sics of the model have been explained, some of the reasons for these 
concerns can be advanced: 
   1.  The reason most often cited in the literature is the sub-
stantial increase in aid levels (Heller, 2005a; Adam and Bevan, 2005). 
In 2006 scaling up seems a more plausible scenario than it was ten 
years ago, following several new initiatives that aim to increase aid to 
developing countries such as the UN Millennium Project, the G8 sum-
mit in Gleneagles, the Millennium Challenge Account of the United 
States of America, the UK Commission on Africa, the new EU strategy 
for Africa,… Many countries have accordingly set themselves targets 
to scale up aid15  (Heller and Gupta, 2002; Gupta et al., 2006a) . 
When all these promises are really turned into disburse-
ments, the aid received by the developing world will substantially 
increase in the future. At the plenary meeting of the SPA in January 
2006, deputy director Richard Carey of the OECD DAC presented fig-
ures on the impact scaling up might have on the ODA received by dif-
ferent countries (table 1). 
	 Table	1:	 Aid	dependency	rises:	results	of	aid	scaling-up	on
	 	 individual	countries. 
Country 2004 2010
(Volume ranking) ODA/GNI ODA/GNI
Tanzania (1) 14% 27 % 
Ethiopia (4) 17% 33%
Mozambique (6) 24% 47%
Malawi (27) 23% 44%
Rwanda (27) 21% 42%
Sierra Leone (39) 25% 48%
Source: Carey, 2006
The figures indicate that aid to these recipients might 
nearly double in six years, showing the importance of good macroeco-
nomic management. Even for countries like Tanzania, Ethiopia and 
Mozambique, some of the ‘donor darlings’ of the last years, this in-
15 Several  OECD  members  have  publicly  an-
nounced targets for ODA/GNI. Belgium and Fin-
land want to reach 0.7% by 2010, France and 
Spain  aim  at  0.7%  by  2012,  UK  announced  a 
timetable to reach 0.7% by 2013 (OECD, 2005). 
Also the European Council agreed in June 2005 to 
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crease in aid is many times larger than the ‘large financial inflows’ they 
received in the previous years.
Although this aid aims to bring a better future to millions 
of people, and will hopefully succeed, such positive effects might be 
undermined if large inflows are not spent efficiently, and thus induce 
Dutch Disease. 
   2.  A second reason is the increasing use of budget support 
by a growing number of donors. Information of the SPA shows that 
GBS, as a percentage of total aid, increased from 25.7% in 2004 to 
27.8% in 200516 . As it are mainly the large donors that use budget 
support, the average per donor per year increased from 16.5% in 2004 
to 18% in 2005 (SPA 2006). Although this way of providing aid has 
many advantages compared to other aid modalities, and is certainly 
a positive evolution, it can make macroeconomic management of aid 
more difficult. In the project rationale of the previous decades, funds 
were mostly linked to the import of goods from the donor country. 
With budget support, aid is now spent by the government, who is typi-
cally assumed to have a greater propensity to spend the funds on non-
tradables (Adam, 2005; Heller and Gupta, 2002). Without orienting 
their spending towards expenditure categories that have less chance 
of causing Dutch Disease, the danger of macroeconomic distortions 
will increase.
   3.  The increasing use of untied aid, as seen in figure 3, can 
also be a reason. Although this evolution is certainly welcomed, it 
raises the likelihood that recipient countries will spend aid resources 
on nontradables, increasing the possibility of Dutch Disease.
	 Figure	3:	 Tied	status	of	bilateral	commitments	(in	percentage	of		
	 	 bilateral	commitments)	
Source: Gupta et al., 2006a
   4.  A last reason for the increasing danger is the growing 
proportion  of  aid  directed  toward  social  spending.  For  Britian,  Kil-
lick (2005) calculated that the proportion of aid devoted to directly 
16 The information from SPA only reflects informa-
tion from a self-selected group of donors (Belgium, 
Canada, Denmark, Finland, France, Germany, Ire-
land, Italy, Japan, Netherlands, Norway, Portugal, 
Sweden, Switzerland, United Kingdom, IMF, the 
World Bank, the African Development Bank and 
the  European  Commission)  and  recipients  (Be-
nin, Burkina Faso, Cape Verde, Ethiopia, Ghana, 
Madagascar,  Malawi,  Mali,  Mozambique,  Niger, 
Rwanda, Senegal, Sierra Leone, Tanzania, Ugan-
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productive activities (economic and rural livelihoods), expressed as a 
percentage of social spending (education, health, ‘social’ categories 
and governance) declined from 371% in 1988/89-1989/90 to 208% in 
1993/94-1994/95 and even to only 45% in 2003/04. That these shifts 
were also present for other DAC-donors during the last decade, can be 
seen in figure 4.
 
	 Figure	4:	 Aid	by	major	purpose	for	all	DAC	member	states
Source: OECD-DAC, International development statistics
The graph makes clear that aid for social infrastructure 
and services has increased during the last ten years, while that for eco-
nomic infrastructure and services and production sectors decreased.17 
Taking into account the importance rightly paid to the MDGs, with 
their focus on social indicators, this trend is not expected to reverse in 
the coming years.
17  The increasing use of debt relief during the last 
decade enlarges this trend as the money that has 
come free in this way, is mostly linked to social 




   4.1  The need for intervening
Until now we assumed that the monetary authorities did 
not intervene. Monetary authorities have however their own objec-
tives: stable inflation and a competitive exchange rate; on which the 
fiscal policies discussed in the previous sections might have an impor-
tant impact when, for example, the supply side does not expand timely 
in reaction to the increased demand or when the tradable sector is hit 
too hard by changes in the exchange rate. 
In this section, we will therefore explain the possible in-
struments monetary authorities can use to reach their objectives. In 
the fifth section we will then bring the fiscal and the monetary deci-
sions together, and explain their need for coordination. 
   4.2  How can the monetary authorities intervene?
 
To explain the link between the previous sections and the 
objectives of the central bank, we will start from the situation where a 
government receives aid. Then we will look at the link between fiscal 
policy and monetary policy objectives and go into the possible reac-
tions of the central bank to remain on target.  
In a typical situation, the government of a developing 
country receives aid from a donor and sells the foreign currency to its 
central bank in exchange for an equivalent value of domestic assets. 
Initially, there is thus no effect on the money supply of the economy. 
Only when the government starts to spend in excess of its tax receipts, 
the money supply in the economy increases. When the central bank 
does not react, keeps the foreign exchange as reserves and undertakes 
no other actions, the impact of the government expenditures is likely 
to be inflationary. If the central bank wants to avoid this and keep the 
macroeconomic variables on target, it can intervene in different ways 
(DFID, 2002): 
   1.  The central bank can sterilize the expansion of the money 
supply by selling foreign exchange to the private sector. Consequently, 
some of the liquidity injected through government expenditures will be 
reduced, but the nominal exchange rate will appreciate. The exact im-
pact on the real exchange rate will depend on the way foreign currency 
is used by the private sector (DFID, 2002; UNDP, 2005c). When capi-
tal goods are imported, the long term growth potential of the economy 
may increase. By importing basic food, local prices could be held down 
and consumption of poor households guaranteed. Additional imports 
of luxury consumer items, would only have an impact on the consump-IOB Discussion Paper 2007-05 • 25 Dutch Disease in Aid-recipient Countries
tion of the rich and the opportunity of undoing the appreciation of the 
RER or further improving the growth prospects for the country would 
be missed (UNDP, 2005c).
   2.  Secondly, the central bank can reduce the liquidity in the 
economy through private banks. The technique that is most often cit-
ed, is the sale of domestic debt to the private sector, typically banks, to 
soak up the excess liquidity in the economy (DFID, 2002; Christensen, 
2005; Prati et al., 2003). Given that domestic interest rates in develop-
ing countries are determined in the short to medium term by domestic 
money market conditions and that these financial markets are rather 
shallow, this can lead to a rapid increase in domestic interest rates and 
a crowding out of the private sector. Evidence of this crowding out of 
private investment was found by Christensen (2005). By using a da-
taset of 27 SSA countries covering a 20-year period (1980-2000), he 
found that an increase in the ratio of domestic debt to M2 of 1 percent, 
decreased the ratio of private sector lending to M2 by 0.15%. 
Other  ways  of  reducing  the  liquidity  through  private 
banks are an increase in reserve requirements of those banks or a shift 
in government deposits from private banks to the Central Bank (Prati 
et al., 2003; Gupta et al., 2005). 
Evidence on the efficiency of these techniques was found 
by Prati et al. (2003). Their estimates show that the sale of govern-
ment bonds and higher government deposits at the central bank sig-
nificantly reduced the real appreciation caused by aid. 
As the explanations above have shown, these interven-
tions can lower inflation but often bring with them other costs to the 
economy. For this reason, there is a need to balance the different costs 
against each other and see what combination of changes in inflation, 
exchange rates and interest rates are best to absorb the aid. High in-
flation of, say, 40% or more, is detrimental to both growth and equity 
and must thus be avoided. Reducing inflation to levels below five per-
cent, however, may also not lead to optimal growth for the economy. 
Empirical evidence suggests that the growth maximising rate of infla-
tion for developing countries lies somewhere between 5-10 percent 
(IMF, 2005a; Adam and Bevan, 2001a,b; Gupta et al., 2005). 
Finally it has to be noted that the rate of appreciation of 
RER and the intervention of the Central Bank will depend on the ex-
change rate regime in use. In a pure float, the central bank sells the 
additional foreign exchange it receives, so that the RER will mainly ap-
preciate through a nominal appreciation. With a fixed exchange rate, 
the fiscal authorities spend the aid and inflation rises. In this case, the 
real appreciation is thus caused by a rise of the domestic price level, 
while the nominal exchange rate remains constant. Consequently the 
demand for cheaper imports increases and the central bank has to sell 26 • IOB Discussion Paper 2007-05 Dutch Disease in Aid-recipient Countries
foreign exchange to keep the exchange rate at its level. (Heller and 
Gupta, 2002; Gupta et al, 2005). Buffie et al. (2005) use a simulation 
to illustrate that these two extreme cases may not give optimal results 
in handling persistent inflows of aid. In a pure float, inflation remains 
limited but the nominal exchange rate is extremely volatile. Alterna-
tively, with a fixed exchange rate, inflation shoots up. Both are situa-
tions that would not lead to successful growth and poverty-reduction. 
A third exchange rate regime, that is preferred by most countries, gives 
better results in their simulation: the managed float. By using the dif-
ferent available instruments in a judicious manner, the central bank 
can keep macroeconomic variables better on target. 
   4.3  Uganda’s experience
Uganda’s  experience  illustrates  this  difficult  balance  a 
government has to strike. Since the beginning of the nineties, donors 
helped financing Uganda’s successful economic development. As this 
aid was mainly spent on nontradables, through a rise in the govern-
ment’s deficit, the liquidity created by fiscal operations increased ten-
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Consequently, the Bank of Uganda needed to intervene to 
keep inflation at its target level of 4 to 5% (see table 2). 
	 Table	2:	 The	Bank	of	Uganda’s	intervention 
1997/8 1998/9 1999/00 2000/1 2001/2 2002/3 2003/4 2004/5
Foreign-exchange sales by the Bank of 
Uganda (%mln)
5 25 117 174 199 247 141 70
Net issue of securities to the market
(Shs Bn)
42 46 150 147 266 216 67 227
Growth in private sector credit (%) 24,8 33,6 6,2 9,4 4,2 28,2 16,2 21,9
Source: Brownbridge and Tumusiime-Mutebile, 2007
For  fear  of  losing  export  competitiveness,  at  the  time 
that terms of trade were worsening, the sales of foreign exchange 
were lower than planned to allow the real exchange rate to depreciate 
(Brownbridge and Tumusiime-Mutebile, 2007). As a result, the real 
effective exchange rate depreciated by 50% between 1997 and 2003 
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As  the  sales  of  foreign  exchange  were  lower  that  pro-
grammed, a larger share of the liquidity created by fiscal operations 
had to be borne by the sales of domestic debt to the private sector. 




Note: PSC = Private-Sector Credit
Source: Brownbridge and Tumusiime-Mutebile, 2007
As a result of the sale of domestic debt, the distribution 
of the government’s domestic borrowing requirement shifted away 
from the Central Bank onto the commercial banks. Their stock of gov-
ernment debt increased by more then 500% in five years and private 
sector borrowing reduced significantly. The average interest rate on a 
364 day Treasury Bill increased from 9% in 1998/1999 up to 17% in 
2002/3 (The Republic of Uganda, 2005). 
By 2002, the Ugandan government came to recognise the 
potential economic danger of this fiscal strategy and the necessary 
sterilisation. From the budgetary year 2002/3 onwards, the govern-
ment therefore started implementing a new strategy of fiscal consoli-
dation. The main aim was to reduce aid dependency and increase do-
mestic revenue mobilization. Because of this, liquidity created through 
fiscal operations fell by a third (see figure 5). Consequently, the Central 
Bank had to sterilize less and more room could be created for private 
sector lending by the commercial banks (see table 2, figure 6 and fig-
ure 7). IOB Discussion Paper 2007-05 • 2 Dutch Disease in Aid-recipient Countries
	 5	 the	need	for	CoordInAtIon	betWeen	monetAry		
	 	 	 And	fIsCAl	polICIes
As illustrated in the previous sections, the efficiency of 
monetary and fiscal policies depend on each other. Coordination of 
both policies must therefore be high on the political agenda of recipi-
ents. For developing countries, that have only limited capacity to per-
form these tasks, this might be a difficult task. That it is however worth 
doing the effort, is shown by a study of the IMF (IMF, 2005b), recently 
supported with evidence reported in Foster and Killick (2006). Both 
studies see coordination as one of the main determinants for good 
macroeconomic management of aid flows. 
   1.  The first important policy decision fiscal and monetary 
authorities will have to discuss is the potential for increasing spending 
in certain sectors without spilling the money or endangering the mac-
roeconomic targets set by the monetary authorities. Two thoughts 
must be balanced against each other. On the one side, certain sectors, 
like health and education, may lack the human capital or infrastructure 
for efficiently using the huge amounts of aid forecasted. As spending 
aid in such an environment would not give an acceptable return and 
induce Dutch Disease, tackling these problems first might be a viable 
strategy in order to optimize the impact of aid in the longer term (Hel-
ler, 2005b; UNDP, 2005a; Bourguignon and Sundberg, 2006).  On the 
other side, given the critical needs of poor people, it might be a defend-
able strategy to sacrifice some short-run growth and allow higher in-
flation rates. In this way certain problems faced by the poor can be ad-
dressed faster while growth can still be significant in the longer term 
(Heller, 2005a and 2005b and Bourguignon and Sundberg, 2006). 
   2.  Cooperation  between  fiscal  and  monetary  authorities 
does not stop with the preparation of the final budget. During the 
budget  year,  resources  may  fall  below  fiscal  forecasts  because  of 
volatile donor resources and incompletely predictable domestic rev-
enue, caused by its high dependency on international trade or weather 
conditions. Further, there is the danger that certain policy reforms 
that are important for keeping macroeconomic stability might not be 
implemented successfully, leading to a different macroeconomic real-
ity than the one forecasted. Regularly reassessing government’s rev-
enues and expenditures is therefore needed to assure macroeconomic 
stability.  To facilitate this process, different scenarios can be worked 
out during the budget preparation process which differ in the amount 
of economic growth or resources received by the government (Gupta 
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   3.  Finally,  coordination  between  the  two  policies  is  also 
needed in a medium- to long-term perspective. With volatile expen-
ditures and revenues in the medium- to long-term, macroeconomic 
management might become difficult, threatening economic growth. 
Together discussing the medium- and long-term expenditure path of 
the government is therefore needed. In the medium term, developing 
countries must be cautious about just spending any large increase in 
aid that comes their way. Saving aid over time, is a defendable strategy 
when aid surges are not assured. In section 6, we will discuss further 
this possibility. In the longer term not only high levels of aid but also 
aid itself will not sustain. Therefore, strategies must be developed by 
recipient countries to boost domestic revenue mobilization. In this 
way, the financing of the budget will also be more certain over time.
To  successfully  accomplish  these  demanding  tasks,  ca-
pacity building might thus be needed in the fiscal institutions respon-
sible for the execution of the budget and at the central bank.
After the preparation of the budget, its successful execu-
tion depends on the capacity of the fiscal institutions, the incidence of 
corruption, the use of adequate auditing,… (IMF-IEO, 2005; Bourgui-
gnon and Sundberg, 2006). The experience of countries undergoing 
commodity booms - circumstances rather similar to those of aid surges 
- has shown that this might be problematic, causing a large scale waste 
of resources and endangering macroeconomic stability. To avoid simi-
lar difficulties in aid-recipient countries, good management of public 
resources will be needed. Donors can contribute to this by building in 
safeguards to monitor the use of their resources. To what extent these 
efforts of donors will be successful remains to be seen, given the dis-
appointing experience of previous PFM-reforms, problems in the past 
with the effectiveness of conditionality imposed by donors, and the 
large scaling up of aid that might increase the pressure on donors to 
give aid indiscriminately (Foster and Killick, 2006).
As the central bank has to collaborate closely with the 
fiscal authorities in an high-aid environment, the capacity currently 
available at central banks might be inadequate, increasing the dan-
ger of important macroeconomic problems. Donors, convinced of the 
importance of macroeconomic stability, have always been willing to 
help recipients with these problems. In the new aid environment, two 
opposing forces must however be weighted against each other when 
accepting this help. On the one side, the danger exists that donors are 
putting too much pressure on recipient countries to accept massive 
increases in aid without considering enough the impact on the total 
economy (Foster and Killick, 2006). On the other hand, too strict mac-
roeconomic targets might take away the opportunity of using aid to 
help desperately poor people survive. Traditionally the IMF has the 
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each  other.  The  way  it  performs  this  task  is  regularly  been  highly 
criticised. Many critics blame the institution for looking only at the 
macroeconomic targets, without due consideration for the opportuni-
ties higher aid could give to the poor (Actionaid International, 2005; 
Ooms and Schrecker, 2005). At the 2006 WIDER-conference on aid, 
Peter Heller of the IMF agreed that the approach currently used by the 
institution is to limit expenditurestrategies of recipient governments 
too much only on aid that is firmly committed by donors. Given that aid 
agencies rarely make commitments for two to three years in advance, 
this strategy puts significant restraints on the expenditure framework 
of the government. Taking into account this characteristic of donors, 
that does not mean that aid will not be available anymore after two 
to three years, Heller proposes the use of a new approach that bases 
government’s expenditures on a “more optimistic and plausible” aid 
scenario that does not assume that aid will drop within two to three 
years (Heller, 2006). Participation of other donors in this analysis 
should help to come up with realistic forecasts.  
	 	 6	the	AdvAntAges	of	spendIng	AId	over	tIme.
Finally we have to remark that in our textbook-analysis 
of Dutch Disease it was assumed that aid is spent by the government, 
followed by a reaction of the central bank to keep its instruments on 
target. Although this is the only way to use aid in the long term, it is 
worth mentioning two other scenarios that are possible. 
In close collaboration, fiscal and monetary authorities 
can decide not to spend aid but hold the foreign currency as interna-
tional reserves. The usual reason for holding international reserves is 
to insulate the country’s capacity to finance its imports from the un-
certain and variable amounts of foreign currency coming from exports. 
By holding international reserves, imports can still be financed even 
when exports are interrupted. For this reason, the amount of interna-
tional reserves is usually expressed in months of imports, with coun-
tries facing more volatile exports, requiring larger amounts of reserves. 
In aid recipient countries, this reason for holding foreign exchange re-
serves may be less important. 
A second reason that will possibly play a larger role in the 
reserve management of these countries, is the build-up of reserves to 
secure domestic budgetary policy from the short run volatility in its 
financing. In aid-recipient developing countries, this volatility is not 
only caused by domestic revenue that is volatile because of its de-
pendency on international trade, weather conditions and other fac-
tors, but also by the low short-term predictability of aid, both in terms 2 • IOB Discussion Paper 2007-05 Dutch Disease in Aid-recipient Countries
of size, because of the disparity between commitments and disburse-
ments, as timing, caused by the various factors that result in disburse-
ments shortfalls (IMF-IEO, 2005; Heller, 2005a). When anticipated 
revenues consequently do not materialize, government faces a choice. 
It either forces spending to follow the volatile pattern of its budgetary 
resources or it allows its deficit to increase and find a way of financing 
it. As foreign financing is often not available, domestic financing can 
squeeze the private sector and increase interest rates, and an increase 
in money supply can cause inflation, the foreign exchange reserves 
could be used to finance the deficit. Following the previous reasoning, 
countries with more volatile budgetary resources might then be ad-
vised to hold more reserves (Bevan, 2005, Adam and Bevan, 2001b; 
Eifert and Gelb, 2005; Heller, 2005a; Roberts, 2005). 
A  third  reason  for  holding  international  reserves,  that 
might also play an important role in countries receiving aid, can be 
found in the medium- and long-term financing of the budget that must 
be assured. As predictability of aid is already not very high in the short 
term, it is not surprising that it is even lower in the medium- to long-
term. Over the past 40 years, aid flows have frequently proven to be pro-
cyclical and aid-surges often sustained only for short periods of time. 
Predicting aid two to three years in advance is then also very difficult. 
Spending aid when it is received may also not be possible as absorp-
tive capacity of the economy can be lacking at the moment resources 
are received. To tackle these problems while assuring macroeconomic 
stability, the government could use stabilization funds in which the ir-
regular inflows are converted into more permanent streams of funding 
so they can be spent at moments when the country can use them or 
needs them. The reserves accumulated at the time that aid is received 
can finance the deficit at the time that aid can be spent in excess of 
taxes received18  (Eifert and Gelb, 2005; IMF IEO, 2005; DFID, 2002; 
Foster and Killick, 2006). 
The benefits of carefully considering the use of resources 
over time and taking into account absorptive capacity of the econo-
my is shown in the success stories of Norway and Botswana. In Nor-
way, the government exercised fiscal discipline, paid back debts and 
built up a fund to avoid the effects of excess demand on the economy 
(Larsen, 2004). The Botswanan government based its expenditure 
on long-term expectations of export earnings and government rev-
enues, avoiding too much fluctuation over time. Remaining revenues 
were saved as foreign reserves in a stabilization fund, a policy decision 
that helped policymakers to keep the exchange rate competitive and 
allowed a larger diversification of the economy. Expenditure decisions 
were further guided by the absorptive capacity of the economy. The 
amount of skilled manpower and the long-term recurrent costs of in-
vestments were taken into account in considering scaling up expendi-
ture (Sarraf and Jiwanji, 2001; Hill, 1991 and Stevens, 2003b). 
18 As it is very reasonable to assume that donors 
do not like the use of their funds for the building 
up  of  reserves,  they  must  think  by  themselves 
what they can do to avoid the use of this option 
by recipient countries. One possibility is to pay at-
tention to the predictability of funds, another is to 
gradually increase aid in line with the expanding 
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In a recent paper of the IMF that looks at the experience 
some countries have with a surge in aid, two countries were found 
to have used the increments in aid to scale up their international re-
serves. Between 1999/2000 and 2002/2003, Ghana and Ethiopia 
saved the largest part of their aid surge in foreign reserves because 
they had very low levels of international reserves before the surge in 
aid, they experienced very volatile aid flows, and they wanted to avoid 
an exchange rate appreciation to preserve international competitive-
ness (IMF, 2005b). 
A concrete proposal of this kind with respect to aid was 
made by Maureen Lewis. As the funding of HIV/AIDS-contributions is 
erratic and provided by donors in a concentrated period, a HIV/AIDS 
Stabilization Fund could be used to ensure sustainable funding over 
time, address the potential macroeconomic problems and optimize 
the impact of aid (Lewis, 2005).  
As the examples of Norway and Botswana illustrate, sav-
ing aid in the form of foreign reserves can be a very efficient strategy for 
revenue stabilization in countries facing volatile revenues. Donors that 
are really concerned about the countries they are supporting, must 
thus give recipients discretion to use aid flexibly, including saving it in 
foreign reserves. Further must donors tackle one of the reasons why 
those recipients use the aid for building up foreign exchange reserves 
instead of spending it on poverty reduction and economic growth. 
Reducing the unpredictability and providing aid in more stable flows 
must therefore be very high on the policy agenda for donors.
Although this strategy of reserve accumulation has its 
advantages, there are also opponents to it. They argue that these re-
serves could be better spent in the developing country, where the re-
turn on investments in productive assets would be much higher than 
the low return these countries are now receiving from short-term US 
Treasury securities, in which the foreign reserves are usually invested 
(see for example Lapavitsas, 2007 or Rodrik, 2006). 
Secondly, government can decide not to spend the aid, 
but sell the foreign exchange received. In countries facing problems 
with high rates of inflation, this strategy can help to reduce monetary 
supply growth and halt inflation (IMF, 2005b).  • IOB Discussion Paper 2007-05 Dutch Disease in Aid-recipient Countries
	 7	 explAInIng	the	Imf-lIterAture
Following this explanation of Dutch Disease and its budg-
etary and macroeconomic impact, we are in a better position to explain 
the terms and reasoning used by the IMF in this respect (see textbox 2) 
	 Textbox	2:	 Explaining	the	IMF-literature:	‘absorb’	and	‘spend’
 
   
Different combinations19  of absorb and spend are now 
possible, all having their particular macroeconomic impact and poten-
tial danger for Dutch Disease as they differ in the amount of money 
injected in the economy and the part of aid used as international pur-
chasing power. We will now explain the four extreme possible combi-
nations of absorbing and spending aid to give an idea of what might 
happen in the many possible combinations of absorb and spend that 
are possible. 
1.  Aid is absorbed and spent. Absorbing and spending aid is the text-
book-case discussed in this paper. The government spends the aid 
and the central bank sells the foreign currency for buying imports, 
widening the current account deficit. The amount of RER apprecia-
tion depends on the characteristics of the economy and on the ex-
tent to which aid directly finances imports. 
2.  Aid is neither absorbed nor spent. In this strategy, the aid flows 
are used to build up international reserves. For fiscal authorities 
facing volatile resource flows or central banks having very low lev-
els of international reserves, this could certainly be an appropriate 
short-run strategy. Donors should leave the possibility open of us-
19  In all scenarios we assume that the govern-
ment receives aid and sells it to the central bank 
















In IMF literature on the macroeconomic impact of aid and the potential danger of 
Dutch Disease, the authors often use the terms ‘absorb’ and ‘spend’. 
Aid absorption is defined as the extent to witch a country’s non-aid current ac-
count deficit widens in response to aid, relative to that aid flow. It measures thus 
the amount of aid that is used to buy imports and takes into account the first and 
second round effects. 
   
Aid spending is defined as a widening of the government’s fiscal deficit net of aid. 
It captures the amount of aid that is used by the government to increase public 
expenditures or reduce taxes. 
 From these definitions it is clear that both take into account the fungibility of 
aid. If the foreign currency of aid is sold by the central bank, but the net sales of 
foreign currency do not increase, absorption will not change as there is no greater 
availability of foreign currency for imports. Similarly, spending will not change 
when the financing of a domestic project, that was paid before from other sources, 
is now paid with aid.IOB Discussion Paper 2007-05 • 5 Dutch Disease in Aid-recipient Countries
ing aid in this way as it can reduce the impact of uncertain financing 
of the government budget for fiscal authorities and makes imports 
less dependent on the foreign currency received from exports, they 
must certainly not see it as a failure of aid. In the long-run, this 
strategy is however not useful as the benefits of spending the aid 
will start to dominate the advantages of this strategy.
3.  Aid is absorbed but not spent. In countries that have not yet 
achieved stabilization, this strategy could be used to reduce infla-
tion. In such a situation the fiscal authorities don’t spend the aid, 
but the monetary authorities sell the foreign exchange to sterilize 
the monetary growth of the economy. 
4.  Aid is spent but not absorbed. Finally, the government could spend 
the aid on local goods and services, while the central bank does not 
sell the foreign currency. The macroeconomic impact of this strat-
egy is similar to deficit spending without aid, except that the inter-
national reserves increase in this scenario and the pressure on the 
local credit market will be lower then when government finances 
the deficit spending by borrowing on the local credit market.  
	 8	 WhAt	does	the	evIdenCe	tell?
In the economic literature, a lot of effort has been under-
taken to find evidence of Dutch Disease. Although the search for evi-
dence is statistically seen a difficult quest, neither convincing evidence 
of an aid-induced real exchange rate appreciation, nor persuasive evi-
dence of an aid-financed contraction of the export-sector was found. 
Generally, controversy remains about whether empirical evidence sup-
ports the existence of this phenomenon (Adam, 2005; Stevens, 2003a; 
Bulir and Lane, 2002; Issa and Ouattara, 2004; Barder, 2006). 
While some authors find evidence in certain countries, oth-
ers argue that there are other reasons than the aid flows that explain 
the economic changes perceived as Dutch Disease. Nkusu (2004a) for 
example, reports a paper of Adenauer and Vagassky in which they find 
evidence of a direct relationship between aid flows and RER apprecia-
tion in Burkina Faso, Côte d’Ivoire, Senegal and Togo, supporting the 
idea of Dutch Disease. Nkusu notes however that the adverse devel-
opments in the world prices of the primary exports of these countries 
and the appreciation of the French franc against the dollar, could have 
played an important role in the economic development of the coun-
tries and the changes of the real exchange rate. 
A recent study of the IMF illustrates the promising experi-
ence of a subset of developing countries20  that have witnessed large 
financial inflows in the previous years but did not face important macr-
oeconomic problems (IMF, 2005b). Using this evidence for telling that 
20 The countries discussed in the paper were: Ethi-
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the large inflows in the future might not be problematic for developing 
countries would however be one step too far as this sample of coun-
tries was biased in favour of good performers21  and the ‘large inflows 
in aid’ these countries experienced were small compared to the in-
creases referred to in section three.  
	 9	 Is	It	only	eConomICs?
In this last part of our paper we want to broaden our view 
and look further than only macroeconomics. To do this, we want to 
split up the problem in two parts and look at the problem of Dutch 
Disease from two different directions. First, economically it must be 
known what policies must be taken to tackle the problem of Dutch Dis-
ease. Stiglitz (2004) notes that economic theory and past experiences 
in several countries have given the knowledge to solve this problem. 
Secondly, one has to ask if governments have the political will to im-
plement these necessary policies. This is the actual problem Stiglitz 
argues. Stevens (2003a) comes to the same conclusion after a litera-
ture survey on the resource curse. According to his findings, Dutch Dis-
ease has essentially something to do with governance and the answer 
lies more in political economy than in macro-economic analysis. In a 
case-by-case  approach,  Stevens  (2003b)  looks  for  the  characteris-
tics of 4 success-stories22  that avoided the resource curse. He finds 4 
characteristics that might explain why the ‘good’ actions were taken 
to avoid Dutch Disease: 
1.  All countries had strong elements of frugality built in the national 
psyche. 
2.  All four had strong governments either as a result of voting support 
or military control. 
3.  All  countries  had  highly  competent  bureaucrats  who  were  well 
versed in developing economic policy. 
4.  The most important characteristic that was present in all case-
studies, was the fact that they were ‘developmental states’. These 
states have two characteristics: 
a.  The first element is an ideological component, the ruling elite  
adopts ‘developmentalism’ as their prime objective. The legiti-
macy of the rulers is thus derived from their ability to deliver eco-
nomic development, implying growth and poverty reduction.  
b.  The second characteristic, a structural one, involves the capac-
ity of the rulers to implement policies efficiently and sagaciously. 
This does not only involve the capabilities to implement the poli-
cies (as in point 3) but also a strong state that can resist pres-
sure and implement sometimes difficult decisions. 
21 2005 IDA Resource Allocation Index (IRAI) of 
Ethiopia: 3.4, Ghana: 3.9, Mozambique 3.5, Tan-
zania 3.9, Uganda 3.9 (IDA-website, 2006). That 
politics might play a role in avoiding Dutch Dis-
ease will be discussed in the next section.
22 The countries he studied were Botswana, Chile, 
Indonesia and Malaysia
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Similar results were found by Mehlum et al. (2006) who 
showed that differences in the quality of institutions determine wheth-
er countries succeed in avoiding the resource curse or not. 
In the countries receiving aid, these political aspects will 
also play an important role. The danger of not paying enough atten-
tion to these aspects might however be lesser in these countries than 
in countries where natural resources were discovered as donors will 
control the use of their aid. 
Going further into the details of these political aspects of 
Dutch Disease would lead us too far away from the economic focus we 
took in this paper and is therefore left to other researchers. 
	 	 10	ConClusIon
Observing the increasing concerns for Dutch Disease in 
the donor community and developing countries receiving large inflows 
of aid, this paper tried to clarify what the problem is and why the dan-
ger is potentially higher in the current aid environment. 
Throughout our paper we saw that, although empirical 
evidence for Dutch Disease caused by aid was not convincing, there 
are enough theoretical arguments suggesting that the risk of Dutch 
Disease must be taken serious if the intention is to substantially scale 
up aid by using new aid modalities such as budget support. Whether 
Dutch Disease will effectively occur, can however not be predicted as 
the long-term interactions in the economy are very complex and dif-
ficult to predict. The spending pattern of aid was shown to have an 
impact  on  the  long-term  reaction  of  the  supply  side,  coordination 
between monetary and fiscal authorities were important to keep the 
macroeconomy stable, absorptive capacity could limit the amount of 
aid that can be successfully spent, donor policies may complicate the 
difficult exercise recipients face, capacity in the recipient’s authorities 
may be insufficient to successfully execute the difficult tasks they are 
facing,… In general, there is thus no a priori case against scaling up, 
based on macroeconomic arguments, but attention will have to be 
paid to how the aid is used. 
As  pure  macroeconomics  did  not  give  a  conclusive  an-
swer on the potential danger of Dutch Disease, we finally looked at 
the problem through some research done on the political economy of 
the countries facing the potential problems of Dutch Disease. By tak-
ing into account that politicians must not only know how to solve the 
problem, but also need the political will to solve it, this line of analysis 
suggests that political characteristics of the recipient’s government 
are important in determining whether a country will be more likely to 
experience Dutch disease or not. 
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